



Scottish Local Authorities

CONTEST Prevent

Code of practice



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# FOREWORD

Scotland, and the rest of the UK, faces threats from an increasingly complex range of violent extremist and terrorist ideologies, groups and individuals. The CONTEST Strategy has been developed to tackle such threats. Prevent is one of four strategies of the main CONTEST Strategy.

Focusing on stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, Prevent encompasses a number of initiatives aimed at protecting and supporting individuals, particularly those who are vulnerable, from being drawn into terrorism. At its core is a safeguarding message, and with the focus on partnership working, it makes safety a shared endeavour.

For a number of years, it has been recognised that Local Authorities have an important role in implementing Prevent and ensuring that it is embedded fully in everyday activities. That role has now been placed on a statutory footing, with the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act requiring Local Authorities to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. This means we need to ensure that Local Authorities have the right corporate governance arrangements and procedures in place to both contribute to preventing vulnerable people from being drawn towards extremism and to respond quickly and effectively to support those who may be at greater risk of radicalisation. It is

equally important to do all we can to prevent the misuse of Local Authority facilities and protect our workforce.

Local Authority staff across a range of functions are in a key position to support vulnerable individuals and can bring their significant experience of working positively with public sector partners to address the emerging challenges posed by radicalisation.

It is important that everyone who works in a Local Authority is confident and knowledgeable in addressing situations that cause concern. This document complements the Statutory Prevent Guidance for Scotland, together with guidance for other sectors, and provides a consistent framework for Local Government involvement in the Prevent professional concerns process to work in partnership with other agencies when concerns arise.

Prevent is about everyone playing their part in keeping Scotland safe.

<p><b>Graham Hope</b></p> <p>Chief Executive of West Lothian Council and SOLACE Lead on Counter Terrorism, including role as SOLACE CONTEST Prevent Lead</p>	
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# 1 PURPOSE

- 1.1 Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the Act) places a duty on certain bodies, listed in Schedule 6 to the Act, to have, in the exercise of their functions, “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. Scottish Local Authorities (LAs) are listed under Schedule 6 of the Act. In addition, there is an additional duty placed on LAs as a result of the Act that requires them to chair and manage Prevent Professional Concerns Case Conferences (please see paragraphs 3.4 onwards).
- 1.2 Statutory guidance for specified Scottish authorities has been developed by the Scottish Government, in response to the Act, and can be found at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance>
- 1.3 The Act states that the listed authorities subject to the provisions must have regard to this statutory guidance when carrying out the duty. The duty does not confer new functions on any specified authority. Rather, the term “due regard”, as used in the Act, means that listed authorities should actively consider and respond proportionately to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism, when they carry out their usual functions, and when they assess all relevant risks, threats and vulnerabilities in their area of operation.
- 1.4 This Code of Practice sits alongside the Guidance for specified Scottish authorities, and is intended to provide LAs with:
  - Clear and concise information to enable them to better meet the Prevent duty placed upon them under s26 of the Act.
  - Information on the process and signs of radicalisation, and vulnerabilities in individuals that may make them more susceptible to radicalisation.
  - Detailed information on the Prevent strategy of the UK Government Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), and how Scottish LAs can better support delivery of the Prevent strategy.
- 1.5 In addition, the Code identifies the role and responsibilities of education authorities, integrated health and social care and children’s services functions, community planning partnerships, grant or contract funded third parties, and arms length companies or trusts.



## 2 INTRODUCTION

**2.1** Scotland, and the rest of the UK, faces unprecedented levels of threat from an increasingly complex range of violent extremist and terrorist ideologies, groups and individuals. Many of these threats are international in scope. In the UK, the CONTEST strategy has been developed to tackle such threats. Prevent is one of four strategies included within the CONTEST Strategy, which are described below:

- ▶ **Protect:** to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack;
- ▶ **Prevent:** to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- ▶ **Prepare:** to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack; and
- ▶ **Pursue:** to stop terrorist attacks.

**2.2** The Prevent Strategy seeks to tackle all forms of terrorist and violent extremist ideology including, but not limited to, International Terrorism (IT – including but not limited to Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISIS and ISIL), Northern Irish Related Terrorism (NIRT) and Domestic Extremism (including Extreme Right and Left Wing, Anti-Semitism, and some other forms like extreme animal rights groups). What these ideologies have in common is a belief in the use of extreme violence and terror to achieve their aims, which are often political. At Appendix 1, summary information is provided that indicates the process of radicalisation and exploitation that may lead an individual to become involved in, or support, terrorism or terrorist activity. It is important to note that there are many training and briefing materials that the Scottish Government and Police Scotland can provide or deliver, in order to improve awareness and understanding of such matters (see further contact details at Section 10).

**2.3** The Prevent strategy is in essence a safeguarding public protection process, like many others deployed in LAs e.g. Getting it Right for Every Child (GIRFEC), Multi Agency Tasking and Co-ordination (MATAC) or Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC). As with these arrangements, a key part of

Prevent strategy is to raise awareness within communities, and key public and third sector organisations, of the causal factors and signs of vulnerability to radicalisation and possible involvement in, or support for, terrorism. Once these are identified, the aim of the Prevent strategy is to intervene at the earliest possible stage, and proactively support individuals or groups to prevent them from becoming or supporting terrorists.

**2.4** The Prevent Strategy focuses activity on three aims (known as the 3 'I's'), which are:

- ▶ **IDEOLOGIES** – Responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it.
- ▶ **INDIVIDUALS** – Preventing individuals from being drawn into terrorism, ensuring they are given appropriate advice and are supported.
- ▶ **INSTITUTIONS** - Working with institutions where there are risks from radicalisation.

**2.5** The primary focus of the Prevent Strategy is on intervening before a person engages in criminal behaviour, that is why Prevent activity is often referred to as existing in 'pre criminal space'. Education, community engagement, effective health and social care, communication and effective partnership work are therefore all crucial in delivering the three aims of the Prevent Strategy.

**2.6** Work can also be undertaken with individuals who are in, or leaving, the Criminal Justice System, and who may have been convicted of relevant terrorist offences. Prevent has a significant role to play in such cases as it will be imperative to ensure that such individuals do not get drawn back into criminality relating to terrorism or violent extremism. In such cases, the emphasis is on a multi agency partnership approach, with a wide variety of support measures being considered to assist the individual in moving away from violent extremism or terrorism influences. Close partnership working with policing, prison and probation agencies in such cases will be critical.



2.7 Delivery of the Prevent strategy is coordinated at a national level by the Scottish Government and Police Scotland working in conjunction with a number of national organisations, and local partners and communities.


2.8 The Scottish Government established the Scottish Preventing Violent Extremist Unit (SPVEU), within the Equalities, Human Rights and Third Sector Division. SPVEU is staffed by Scottish Government and Police Scotland officers, and a number of secondees from LAs and other sectors. The SPVEU acts as a strategic link between the Scottish Government and Police Scotland and works in partnership with the Prevent Delivery Unit (PDU) and Police Scotland CONTEST Delivery Managers in supporting and guiding local Prevent activity. SPVEU also works with national and local organisations, and local communities, and funds a range of Prevent activities across Scotland.

- Scottish Prison Service - Care Inspectorate - Office for Security & Counter Terrorism (Home Office) - Police Scotland – Scottish Fire & Rescue Service.

2.11 At a local authority level there are a number of local multi agency 'Divisional CONTEST Groups', aligned to Police Scotland divisional boundaries that are the focus for local Prevent activities. These groups have developed Local CONTEST Implementation Plans, within which sit agreed local Prevent actions. LAs are critical to the success of such groups and many LAs across Scotland are already engaged in supporting, or chairing, such groups.

2.12 Police Scotland has established a PDU which is situated within the Safer Communities section of Specialist Crime Division. The PDU deploys dedicated Prevent Officers located throughout Scotland with geographical responsibility for local Prevent activity. These officers are tasked with working alongside local policing divisions

2.9 SPVEU also has responsibility for the Scottish Prevent Sub-Group, which is a national multi agency forum comprising of key national Prevent partners. This Sub Group has developed and agreed a Scottish CONTEST Prevent Implementation Plan, which describes all national multi agency Prevent activity. The Sub Group is responsible for monitoring and evaluating progress at both a national and local level, and reporting this to the National Multi-Agency Strategic CONTEST Board, which coordinates and monitors all four elements of CONTEST activity in Scotland.



2.10 Partners involved in the Scottish Prevent Sub-Group include:  
SOLACE - NHS Scotland - Higher Education - Further Education - Colleges Scotland - Armed Forces - Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator - Education Scotland - Social Work Scotland

and relevant partners to raise awareness and understanding of Prevent, together with supporting the multi-agency work undertaken to safeguard individuals where there are concerns about radicalisation and exploitation.



## 3 THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

**3.1** LAs have a key role in the delivery of the Prevent Strategy, which is aligned to a range of existing statutory duties covering child and adult protection and offender management. In addition, as a result of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, LAs now have a statutory duty to pay due regard to the Prevent Strategy, as described above.

**3.2** This Code of Practice identifies a range of practical actions that will enable LAs to meet their statutory duties, and play their part in tackling violent extremism and terrorism. LAs are not acting alone in this work. As indicated above, Local Multi Agency CONTEST Groups cover the whole of Scotland and are valuable local sources of information, support and resources. It is also important to note that there are national resources, like the PDU and SPVEU, and the SOLACE CONTEST Prevent Lead, that can advise and assist LAs in this area of work.

### **Leadership and Single Points of Contact (SPOC)**

**3.3** It is recommended that the Chief Executive, the LA Senior Management Team, and the Political Leader of the Council, demonstrate leadership and commitment with regard to the CONTEST strategy, and CONTEST Prevent related activity. In order to ensure the LA manages and evaluates Prevent activity in a coordinated and effective way, it is recommended that the Chief Executive appoint a Single Point of Contact (SPOC) who is a Chief Official (or other relevant senior official deemed appropriate by the local authority). Additionally, the nominated SPOC could also identify a Deputy SPOC in case of leave or other absence from the authority. The role of the SPOC is critical in engaging with the local multi agency Divisional CONTEST Group, coordinating activity with other local partners and coordinating activity within the LA on Prevent. In addition, it is recommended that the LA SPOC also oversees the development and implementation of the Prevent Professional Concerns Case (PPC) Conferencing process, and agrees a suitable chair for Prevent Professional Concerns Case Conferences (see below). Finally, it is strongly recommended that the LA Senior

Management Team and LA SPOC (and if relevant Deputy SPOC) receive regular Emerging and Residual Threat Local Profiles (ERTLPs), from PDU or SPVEU colleagues (see Section 10 for contact details), that will provide an up to date picture of terrorist activities, threats, risks and vulnerabilities in their area of operation, and suggest possible courses of action in line with this Code of Practice. Whilst such information will be highly sensitive, it is essential that key senior staff across the LA and the LA SPOC (or deputy where relevant) receive such information, as they are responsible for developing and delivering the LA response.

### **Prevent Professional Concerns Case Conferences**

**3.4** Individuals who are at risk of becoming or supporting terrorists, and who are known to policing agencies, will be managed through a process known as Prevent Case Management. One option within Prevent Case Management is for the PDU to ask a LA to hold a multi-agency case conference to agree partnership actions to address assessed risks and vulnerabilities. In Scotland, this process is known as a Prevent Professional Concerns (PPC) Case Conference. Section 37(5) of the CT and Security Act 2015 requires a PPC Case Conference to be established and chaired by the responsible local authority (defined as a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1994). PPC Case Conferences should be initiated by a LA SPOC, in consultation with relevant local and national police colleagues, based on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities (known as a Violent Extremism Risk Assessment or VERA – see Appendix 1). A PPC Case Conference is not designed to replace any existing national statutory provisions or public protection arrangements in place for examining and tackling the risks associated with either a vulnerable adult or child. Therefore, the management of PPC Case Conferences should be seen as one option within these existing arrangements, designed to tackle the specific vulnerabilities and risks relating to terrorist or violent extremist radicalisation.



3.5 The success of PPC Case Conferences will depend on the extent and quality of partner and LA engagement. With regard to partner agency and LA functions, Schedule 6 of the Act requires participation in the PPC Case Conference by the following:

- NHS;
- Social Workers;
- Schools staff – including the GIRFEC named person in the case of children and young people;
- Youth Offending Services;
- Home Office Immigration (Immigration Enforcement, UK Visas & Immigration (UKVI) and Corporate Services);
- Border Force;
- Housing;
- Youth and community workers;
- Prisons;
- Higher Education;
- Further Education;
- Independent and Grant Aided Schools;
- Prisons; and
- Police.

3.6 Referrals into the LA for a PPC Case Conference may come from a variety of sources or through existing public (adult or child) protection arrangements. Such referrals are most likely to originate from police services. Referrals must come via the LA SPOC in the first instance, who will then call and agree a relevant chair for the PPC Case Conference. If the referral comes from the police, the PDU will provide an appropriate update in relation to the assessed vulnerability associated with the individual or individuals being referred (known as a Violent Extremism Risk Assessment or VERA – see Appendix 1), and an update on all Prevent related activity to date. If a referral comes from an agency or source that does not provide a VERA, then an assessment must be completed by an officer from the PDU or SPVEU prior to the PPC Case Conference being held.

3.7 There is no single way of identifying who is likely to be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism or violent extremism. Factors that may have a bearing on someone becoming vulnerable may include: peer pressure, influence from other people or via the internet, bullying, a crime against them or their involvement in crime, anti social behaviour, family tensions, race or hate crime, lack of self esteem or identity, and personal or political grievances. LAs

should try to develop effective links between those coming into contact with such vulnerable individuals, for example, those working in the education sector, social services, health, children's and youth services, criminal justice and offender management services, and relevant community organisations. LAs should use their networks to highlight the importance of protecting those who are susceptible to being drawn into terrorism, and to raise awareness about Prevent and how PPC Case Conferences can offer support and solutions. PPC Case Conference members are not expected to become experts in countering radicalisation but they should have completed the free SPVEU training course on PPC Case Conferences, which can be delivered at the first meeting of the PPC Case Conference by SPVEU staff. Alternatively, generic introductory PPC training can also be offered by SPVEU to relevant professionals. This training could be preceded by attending a Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP), which will also enable staff to be better equipped to recognise the signs of radicalisation and exploitation.

3.8 It is important to note that the participation of an individual / s of concern in activities that result from a PPC Case Conference remains voluntary, as identified in section 36(4)(b) of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Consequently, consent is required to be given by the individual of concern (or their parent/guardian in the case of a child) in advance of activities or actions being delivered or implemented. All individuals of concern who receive support through any PPC Case Conference must be made aware that they are receiving this as part of a programme to protect people from being drawn into or supporting terrorism, what the aims of the process are, and what to expect. Where someone does not wish to engage in, or continue with, the PPC process, it may be appropriate to offer or provide alternative support through other mainstream services, such as housing, employability, social work or education.

There may also be other actions that policing agencies would wish to instigate that would not require the consent of the individual / s in question, or agreement at the multi agency PPC Case Conference by participating agencies.



**3.9** Once a PPC Case Conference is held, partners have a range of intervention options open to them, aligned to the three areas of Prevent activity (see Appendix 2 for some potential options). Some of these options may well be tried and tested which public service interventions utilised when working with vulnerable individuals, others maybe more specialist in nature.

**3.10** Discussions held at the PPC Case Conference, the associated actions agreed by the multi-agency partners, and review dates for all activity, must be recorded and passed to the relevant local PDU contact. The PDU contact will be responsible for storing this documentation, not the LA or other partners involved in the PPC process. Closure of a PPC Case Conference will be the judgement call of the LA SPOC, in consultation with the people involved in the PPC Case Conference. The views of the senior representative from Police Scotland involved in this group will be particularly important with regard to the decision.

**Information Sharing and Data Storage**

**3.11** Partnership working is critical to the effective delivery of the Prevent Strategy and it is only through the relevant, proportionate and secure sharing of information between agencies that vulnerable individuals will be identified, and properly supported.

**3.12** It will therefore be necessary for a local Information Sharing Protocol (ISP) to be developed and agreed. Advice on these matters, and model agreements, can be sought from the PDU or SPVEU, which could allow for the meaningful, legal and appropriate sharing of information between the relevant partner agencies in line with Section 29 of the Data Protection Act 1998.

**3.13** Police Scotland have a strong preference to only request information from, and share information with, organisations that have signed an ISP specific to the information in question (i.e. information related to counter terrorism and violent extremism). However, in certain emergency circumstances, information may well have to be shared outwith an agreed ISP and this will be a judgement call for the senior Police Scotland Officer involved in the Local CONTEST Multi Agency Group, and the LA SPOC.

**3.14** The Local CONTEST Multi Agency group, with the support of the senior Police Scotland Officer involved and the LA SPOC (or deputy or PPC Case

Conference Chair), should ensure that a local agreement is developed and signed by all relevant partner agencies, either involved in local Multi Agency Divisional CONTEST groups or PPC Case Conferences. The LA SPOC will include the LA Data Protection Manager, Chief Information Officer or other relevant senior officer in the development and agreement of the ISP. Once signed, the ISP will be stored by Police Scotland and a copy retained by the local CONTEST group and the PDU. With regard to PPC Case Conference data and information storage, this will be the responsibility of the PDU, however, partners should satisfy themselves that their own business requirements are catered for.

**Cross Local Authority Working**

**3.15** Where there is cross LA working required on Prevent or PPC Case Conferences, LAs may decide to run meetings in conjunction with more than one other local authority. Section 41(3) of the CT and Security Act 2015 informs that two or more local authorities may have a Prevent meeting in place for a combined area.

**3.16** Partner agencies and the PPC Case Conference Chair (the LA SPOC or deputy) must be satisfied that the combined meeting is fit for purpose, and that it will effectively manage the vulnerability and risks associated with Prevent cases. If a case involves two or more local authority areas, for instance the individual resides in one authority, but works or attends school in another, then both local authorities must attend the meeting. The lead authority is always the authority in which the individual resides.

**Organisational Capability, Training and Raising Awareness**

**3.17** The statutory Prevent duty requires LAs to undertake training needs analysis with regard to delivery of the duty. Advice on these matters can be sought from the PDU or SPVEU. There is also a wide range of Prevent training and awareness raising products available in Scotland, information about which is available from SPVEU or Police Scotland PDU colleagues (see Section 10). It is important that the LA SPOC has a good understanding of the requirement to conduct a training needs analysis, the availability of Prevent training and awareness raising products, and the key role they have in coordinating, monitoring and evaluating the delivery of training and raising awareness modules to relevant LA staff.



**3.18** As identified above, it is important to remember that free training is offered by SPVEU on the PPC Case Conference process, as this comprises a specific legal duty for LAs. It is recommended that all LA staff and partner agency staff that are likely to participate in PPC Case Conferences participate in this training.

### **Participation in Local Multi Agency Divisional CONTEST Groups**

**3.19** As identified above, local multi agency Divisional CONTEST Groups cover the whole of Scotland. In some areas such groups have established Prevent Sub Groups. Currently, each group is aligned to a local Police Scotland Division, and may cover one or more LA areas. The primary role of this local group is to develop a Local CONTEST Implementation Plan, within which will sit a range of Prevent strategy actions and projects, aligned to the three aims of the Prevent strategy (described at paragraph 2.4).

**3.20** The LA will have much to contribute to the running of these groups, and in some cases will chair the group. LA SPOCs (or deputies where relevant) should sit on these groups and act as the conduit for information into the LA and from the LA into the group.

**3.21** Activity delivered as a result of the delivery of local CONTEST Implementation Plans will be monitored, evaluated and recorded by the local multi agency Divisional CONTEST Group. This will take place every three months (although LAs will be expected to report every six months as a minimum). In addition, Police Scotland (PDU) and the Scottish Government (SPVEU) will request this information every three months in order to inform national monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems.

### **Public Venues and Premises**

**3.22** In complying with the Prevent duty it is recommended that LAs ensure that policies and practices relating to publicly owned and managed venues or premises (or the management of premises that are funded through LAs) do not provide a platform for terrorists and violent extremists, and that they are not used to disseminate terrorist or extremist information. This includes considering whether or not information and communication technology equipment is available to the general public for such purposes. If risks are identified, LAs should consider utilising filtering solutions that limit access to terrorist and extremist material.



## 4

## EDUCATION AUTHORITIES AND INTEGRATED CHILDREN'S SERVICES

- 4.1 Work with schools and young people is particularly important with regard to the Prevent Duty. It is therefore recommended that LA arrangements in relation to the Prevent Duty be applied to schools, and to other settings that involve work with young people, in a proportionate and sensitive manner
- 4.2 In addition to training and briefing for relevant staff working in such settings, it may also be appropriate to consider the need for briefing and raising awareness with volunteers and Parent Councils, and other third party organisations working in such settings. The recommendation is that you seek advice in the first instance from the Local Multi Agency Divisional CONTEST Group. If a solution cannot be provided by this group, advice and support can be sought from the SPVEU or the PDU (see Section 10 for contact details), as the tone and scale of such activities will require sensitive management.
- 4.3 It is noted that LAs would already have policies relating to the use of information and communications technology in schools, and that these policies would make explicit reference to the need to ensure safe and appropriate usage, covering what is and what is not permissible. It is recommended that such policies contain specific reference to the statutory Prevent Duty. Such references should be linked to related matters on safeguarding, child protection and restricting access to harmful and inappropriate internet content. Some educational institutions will already use filtering as a means of restricting access to harmful internet content. Consideration should therefore be given to the widespread use of filters as part of the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.
- 4.4 Risks to young people from being drawn into terrorism or violent extremism are often multidimensional and can be sustained, or episodic. LAs would therefore be expected to demonstrate an awareness of the Prevent strategy in their work to implement the Getting it Right for Every Child (GIRFEC) approach. In this regard, the role of the 'named person' will be critical, specifically in progressing assessments and interventions as a result of PPC Case Conferences. It is strongly recommended that the 'named person' attends and participates in any PPC Case Conference that involve a child or young person.
- 4.5 Many elements of the Curriculum for Excellence, are also relevant to the Prevent Duty. For example, Curriculum for Excellence highlights the importance of global citizenship and engaging young people in a healthy, democratic society, all of which are relevant to stopping people becoming involved in, or supporting, terrorism.
- 4.6 It is also recommended that where LAs are engaged in developing integrated children's service plans and functions that the Prevent strategy, and the Prevent legal duty, is explicitly referenced, and that staff involved in the development and delivery of such plans and functions are linked into local multi agency Divisional CONTEST Groups.



## 5 INTEGRATED HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE

- 5.1 As a result of the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014, LAs will have entered into joint arrangements, through an integrated joint board / authority or other arrangement, to deliver health and social care services. It is important to note that NHS Scotland has already published a Prevent Guidance Document, entitled 'Playing Our Part', for the benefit of NHS Boards, which will be a valuable resource to managers and operational staff of integrated health and social care functions.
- 5.2 The nominated LA SPOC (or deputy where appropriate) will have a critical role to play in ensuring the integrated board or authority is sighted on, and understands the impact of, the Prevent Duty and this Code of Practice. Specifically, the involvement of staff and managers from integrated authorities in training and awareness raising programmes and PPC Case Conferences will be a critical success factor.

## 6 COMMISSIONING AND PROCUREMENT

- 6.1 LAs are engaged in a wide variety of commissioning and other procurement activity, whether this is grants or contracts, or other funding routes. The requirement to have due regard to the Prevent Duty will be especially relevant in respect of funding third parties to deliver services to vulnerable individuals or at risk communities, or to manage public premises and venues.
- 6.2 All such funding will require some form of grant agreement or contract, and it is recommended that where such an agreement or contract is particularly relevant to risks and threats identified in the ERTLP, or to the Prevent Duty, that specific reference is made in such an agreement to the requirement to pay due regard to the Prevent Duty. Advice on such matters can be sought from the SOLACE prevent lead, PDU or SPVEU colleagues, or via the LA SPOC.

## 7 ARMS LENGTH ORGANISATIONS, AND COMPANIES AND TRUSTS

- 7.1 LAs often establish arm length companies, organisations or trusts (often known as ALEOs) that deliver business on behalf of, or in partnership with, the LA. It is recommended that the LA SPOC (or deputy where appropriate) reviews current arrangements with ALEOs and assesses relevance to the Prevent Duty, and risks, threats and vulnerabilities identified in the ERTLP, to assess the extent of Prevent work that maybe required with an ALEO.



## 8 COMMUNITY PLANNING PARTNERSHIPS

- 8.1 LAs have a duty under the Local Government (Scotland) Act 2003, and more recently the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, to deliver community planning. Commonly this involves the establishment, support and development of an Accountable Body (often a Board) to develop, approve and deliver a community plan (or Single Outcome Agreement or Local Outcome Improvement Plan).
- 8.2 Community Plans will often make reference to the need to deliver on outcomes and objectives related to community safety, child and adult protection and reducing reoffending, all of which are relevant to the Prevent Duty.
- 8.3 It is therefore recommended that community planning boards and community plans make a general reference to the need to pay due regard to the Prevent Duty, alongside other community safety, adult and child protection and reducing reoffending outcomes, objectives and actions. However, it will not be necessary to reference detailed Prevent objectives, actions or performance measures, as community plans already contain a wide array of social, economic and environmental data and this content would be more appropriately referenced in the Local CONTEST Implementation Plan.

## 9 MONITORING, EVALUATING AND REPORTING

- 9.1 Monitoring, evaluating and reporting on Prevent, and other CONTEST activity, should take place primarily as part of the local multi agency Divisional CONTEST Group, on a quarterly basis aligned to the Local CONTEST Implementation Plan, which will then feed into national CONTEST governance and reporting systems and structures. LAs, as indicated above, will be expected to report, as a minimum, every six months on such activities, although some may wish to report every quarter. The PDU and SPVEU will work with LAs to co-produce monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements which are proportionate and relevant, through LA SPOCs and local multi agency Divisional CONTEST Groups. This will include specific performance indicators relevant to the Prevent Duty and this Code of Practice.
- 9.2 It may also be appropriate to report to internal LA senior management teams on progress against the Local CONTEST Implementation Plan, the National Prevent Statutory Guidance, or this Code of Practice. It is recommended that where a LA intends to engage in public reporting on Prevent activities (or other CONTEST related activities), including LA committees, that advice is sought from the PDU and SPVEU on such matters (see Section 10 for contact details). This is in line with current practice with regard to serious and organised crime reporting arrangements.
- 9.3 In addition, it should be noted that the National Prevent Guidance indicates that audit activity may take place as part of existing multi agency arrangements, or in exceptional circumstances, through Scottish Ministerial intervention or inspection and audit frameworks e.g. audit of best value and community planning, where there is clear evidence of persistent non compliance with the Prevent Duty. However, it should also be noted that such audit activity would be very much 'an action of last resort' and that all reasonable attempts will be made to support and enable compliance with the Prevent Duty across all LAs.



## 10 FURTHER INFORMATION AND SUPPORT

10.1 Further information and support can be obtained from the following:

➤ **Scottish Preventing Violent Extremism Unit:**

Telephone 0131 244 0693

➤ **Prevent Delivery Unit East:**

Telephone 0131 311 3230

➤ **Prevent Delivery Unit West:**

Telephone 01236 818940

➤ **Prevent Delivery Unit North:**

Telephone 01382 596021

➤ **Email:** [PreventDeliveryUnit@scotland.pnn.police.uk](mailto:PreventDeliveryUnit@scotland.pnn.police.uk)

➤ **SOLACE CONTEST Lead**

Graham Hope, Chief Executive, West Lothian Council

Email [graham.hope@westlothian.gov.uk](mailto:graham.hope@westlothian.gov.uk) Telephone 01506 281697

**Alternatively, to access relevant support and advice contact your local police on 101 (non-emergency). In cases of emergency, please dial 999.**



## Appendix 1

### Understanding Radicalisation and Exploitation and the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Framework

(Radicalisation and Exploitation content taken from the 'NHS Scotland – Playing Our Part – Prevent Guidance for NHS')

#### Introduction

There is no single profile of a person who is likely to become involved in terrorist related activity, or single indicator of when a person might move to support extremism.

An increasing body of information indicates that factors thought to relate to personal experiences of vulnerable individuals affect the way in which they relate to their personal environment, and may make them susceptible to exploitation by those seeking to radicalise, potentially leading to them supporting terrorist activities.

Vulnerable individuals who may be susceptible to radicalisation could be service users, patients, carers and / or staff. Recent case studies of incidents highlight that factors such as a negative change in a person's behaviour or circumstances may indicate increased vulnerability.

#### Radicalisation

Radicalisation is a process. It has no single route or pathway. It is generally more common for susceptible individuals to become involved in terrorist related activity through the influence of others. Vulnerable individuals may be exploited in many ways by radicalisers who target their vulnerability.

Radicalisers (see glossary of terms at Appendix 3) often use a persuasive rationale or narrative and are usually charismatic individuals who are able to attract people to their cause based on a particular interpretation or distortion of history, politics or religion.

Initial contact may be via:

- peers, siblings, other family members or acquaintances with the process of radicalisation often being a social one;
- a range of unsupervised environments, such as gyms or cafés;
- in private in individual's homes; and
- the Internet and Social Media.

Contact with radicalisers is also variable and may be direct (i.e. face-to-face), or indirect through the Internet, social networking or other forms of social media. More commonly it will be through a combination of the above.

#### Use of extremist rationale or 'narrative'

Radicalisers usually attract people to their cause through a persuasive rationale contained within a 'single narrative' (see glossary of terms – Appendix 3) that has the potential to influence views. Inspiring new recruits, embedding the beliefs of those with established extreme views and/or persuading others of the legitimacy of their cause is the primary objective of those who seek to radicalise vulnerable individuals.

#### Exploitation

The factors surrounding vulnerability are many and they are unique to each person. It is increasingly recognised that the personal experiences of vulnerable people affect the way in which they relate to their external environment.

#### Susceptibility to exploitation

In terms of personal vulnerability, various factors, expressed in the diagram over, may make individuals susceptible to exploitation. None of these are conclusive in themselves, or exclusive of each other. Therefore they should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with the particular circumstances of the individual and any other signs of radicalisation.



**Identity crisis**

Young adults exploring issues of identity can feel distant from their parents/family, cultural and religious heritage and uncomfortable with their place in society around them. Radicalisers exploit this by providing a sense of purpose or feelings of belonging. Where this occurs, it can often manifest itself in a change in a person’s behaviour, their circle of friends, the way they interact with others and the way they spend their time.

**Personal crisis**

This may for example, include significant tensions within the family that produce a sense of injustice within the vulnerable individual and alienation from the traditional certainties of family life.

**Personal circumstances**

The experience of migration, local tensions or events affecting families in countries of origin

may contribute to alienation from UK values and a decision to cause harm to symbols of the community or state.


**Adults at risk**

Adults who may be at risk, as defined by the Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) Act 2007 and who are:

- Unable to safeguard their own well-being, property, rights or other interests, and
- At risk of harm, and
- Affected by disability, mental disorder, illness or physical or mental infirmity, and / or are
- More vulnerable to being harmed than adults who are not so affected.

The diagram below indicates the main factors at play with regard to radicalisation and exploitation:

## Vulnerability Factors



**Terrorism**

*Terrorism is defined as: an act that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people and/or damage to property; or seriously interferes with or disrupts an electronic system.*

There are various forms of terrorist activity ranging from ‘lone actors’ to more organised groups, who may be involved in fundraising, recruiting, training, glorifying or attack planning. In addition to physical forms of attack, terrorists may also try to access information that may be of use to

them, for example by infiltrating an organisation or securing the assistance of an “insider”.

There is no typical profile for a UK based terrorist. On going research is contributing to the body of knowledge about how and why individuals become involved with terrorist related activity. It highlights that the radicalisation process, or path to engagement with terrorist-related activity, is neither linear nor predictable, and that the length of time involved can differ greatly, ranging from a few weeks to a number of years.



The following factors have been found to contribute to vulnerable people joining certain groups that support terrorist-related activity:

- need to express or act on feelings of anger, grievance or injustice;
- desire for excitement, comradeship or adventure;
- fascination with violence, weapons and uniforms; and
- them-and-us thinking.

**VIOLENT EXTREMISM RISK ASSESSMENT (VERA)**

The VERA is a system to identify factors in an individual that may lead them to become more susceptible to supporting or becoming involved in terrorism, or to resist such influences. It is built around five dimensions:

- beliefs and attitudes
- context and intent
- history and capability
- commitment and motivation
- protective items

Some examples of indicators for each of the five dimensions are listed in the table below:

beliefs and attitudes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ attachment to ideology</li> <li>➤ dehumanisation of identified targets</li> </ul>
context and intent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ seeker or consumer of violent extremist material</li> <li>➤ personal contact with violent extremists</li> </ul>
history and capability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ early exposure to pro violent extremist / militant ideology</li> <li>➤ tactical, paramilitary or explosives training</li> </ul>
commitment and motivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ glorification of violent action</li> <li>➤ driven by moral superiority</li> </ul>
protective items	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ involvement with criminal offence related programmes</li> <li>➤ family support for non violence</li> </ul>



## Appendix 2

### Prevent intervention

Ideology	Individuals	Institutions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Empowering local voices that have skills and knowledge to challenge narratives, including training for community members, on challenging arguments.</li> <li>➤ Collaborative working with statutory partners to intervene to disrupt ideologues and delivery of their messages.</li> <li>➤ Referral to alternative sources and influences e.g. appropriate theological texts or websites.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Use of generic personal support interventions through multi-agency partners to improve quality of life and personal environment.</li> <li>➤ Identify potential holistic family interventions.</li> <li>➤ Consider whether interventions with some of the participants exist in the context of gangs or other organised crime reduction initiatives.</li> <li>➤ Examination of individual lifestyles to determine ‘Achilles heel’ i.e. strong opportunities for influence and change.</li> <li>➤ Consider group engagement opportunities to support and safeguard vulnerable individuals.</li> <li>➤ Consideration should be given to the use of PDU Officers where appropriate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Generic messaging into communities / institutions on specific issues, e.g. counter terrorism narratives, facilitation, travel to train, and fund raising</li> <li>➤ Deliver overt specific messaging into specific venues / institutions attended by individuals</li> <li>➤ Consider engagement with key personnel at venues / institutions with a view to supporting vulnerable individuals</li> <li>➤ Maintain relationship with venues for wider Prevent opportunities for the future.</li> </ul>

# Ideologies - Case Study Example 1

**Situation:**

An extremist group has set up their version of a Da’wah (the proselytising or preaching of Islam) stall in the shopping centre. The Police and LA have received reports that the group are handing out leaflets referring to private prayer meetings and are confrontational with members of the public and other Muslim groups engaged in their own Da’wah activity. The Da’wah stall is being set up every Saturday morning. There are concerns around the group’s role in radicalising vulnerable individuals and contributing to wider community tensions. The leader of the Da’wah is a very charismatic individual who is known to have expressed private, but not public, support for ISIS/ISIL activity abroad.

**Response:**

The initial Prevent LA response to this situation would be to discuss this at the local multi agency Divisional CONTEST Group, and to devise a set of objectives to address these issues. The objectives would in turn feed a number of actions such as;

- Collaboration with the Police in order to explore any local civic governance licensing or LA byelaws that could be used to restrict the Da’wah activity.

- In addition to any general Prevent messaging that is being promulgated in the area, if a specific area requires additional emphasis, LA Officers are well placed to utilise the wider community safety and community learning and development resources, as well as Police responses.
- Utilising wider police engagement with local mosques and influential Muslim figures to build community resilience to any extremist narratives espoused by the group.
- Identification of peripheral members of the group who may be suitable for PPC Case Conference referral if they are assessed as vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism through their engagement with the group.

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**NB.** *These responses can consist of pre-planned elements as well as immediate actions undertaken on discovery of such Da’wah activity through routine operations. The initial actions will be dependent upon a wider understanding across the LA of the issues and impact that this extremist activity can have upon communities.*

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## Ideologies - Case Study Example 2

### Situation:

A Muslim family has reported that their eldest son has gone missing, who is 21 years old. He is a university science graduate, and has a job at a well paid local chemical factory. However, he has recently resigned from his job, and started attending a youth group at the local Mosque, and after further investigation by the Police and the parents, it transpires that he has travelled to Syria to engage in fighting alongside the ISIS/ISIL terrorist group. The Police have undertaken a number of lines of further enquiry as part of a CT investigation and deployed a Family Liaison Officer (FLO) to facilitate communication between the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and the family. Police Scotland have also referred the younger brother in the family to the LA PPC Case Conference process as he is exhibiting similar desires to travel to Syria when he is older, and find out more about terrorist ideologies and groups in Syria. The younger boy is 13 years old and attends a local secondary school. He has a record of good behaviour at the school and good attainment, but recently has become aggressive and isolated from his peer group.

### Response:

The LA response to this situation would be to establish a PPC Case Conference, chaired by the LA SPOC, for the younger brother. The PPC Case Conference would devise a set of objectives to address these issues. The objectives would in turn feed a number of actions such as;

- Work with the young brother's school and teaching staff to make them aware of the situation through GIRFEC arrangements, to offer more support for the brother.
- Offer training to school teaching and guidance staff.
- Approach the parents to agree a course of action within the home.
- Assess whether or not generic or specialised youth services would be available to the younger brother.
- Source a credible ideological scholar who could work with the family and the younger brother.
- Work with the young brother directly to alert him to the risks of travel to Syria and the reality of life in ISIS.
- Where necessary, appropriate partner agencies will be utilised to provide Prevent interventions.

## Ideologies - Case Study Example 3

### Situation:

A community centre manager has reported a new youth group of 10 under 18 year olds meeting in the building. They are from a local estate with known links to football casual groups. He has reported suspicions that they are raising funds for some groups in Northern Ireland, although the precise nature of the groups is unknown. On reviewing their internet use in the building, he has noticed that they are accessing inappropriate websites. When he has enquired about the above, they have displayed very defensive and aggressive behaviours. The manager knows the parents, he has approached some of them about these matters, but they have shown no interest in asking further questions of their children. The last time they had a meeting, one individual member of the group appeared in paramilitary uniform, and others brought flags. Three of the young people were previously known to the LA as a result of child protection processes.

### Response:

The LA Prevent response to this situation would be to refer this to the Local Multi Agency Divisional CONTEST Group to devise a set of objectives to address these issues. The objectives would in turn feed a number of actions such as;

- Report this matter to the PDU (see section 10) as soon as possible.
- Explore with the centre manager the precise nature and numbers of the group, and any information about parents or wider peer group.
- Explore the possibility of approaching the parents, members of the group and wider peer group to gather more information.
- Identify opportunities to intervene with group members to offer alternative or diversionary youth activities, either one to one or group interventions.
- Explore opportunities to make the group aware of restrictions of such activities in the community centre and inform the community centre management committee of any breaches. It would be important though to consider carefully applying these as it would not be desirable to lose contact with the group and for them to continue but by meeting elsewhere.
- Contribute to VERA assessments on some of the young people known to the LA utilising knowledge from officers involved in the child protection arrangements.



## Appendix 3

### GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Term / Abbreviation	Explanation
PDU	Police Scotland Prevent Delivery Unit – the national coordinating unit for all Police Scotland Prevent activity
SPVEU	Scottish Preventing Violent Extremism Unit – the national coordinating unit for Scottish Government for all Prevent activity
ERTLP	Emerging Risks and Threats Local Profile – document developed by policing agencies in Scotland that describes key terrorist risks and threats in local areas, shared with Chief Executives of local authorities
SPOC	Single Point of Contact – the person tasked with acting as the primary reference point for all information and activity on Prevent in an organisation
LA	Local authority
PPC Case Conferences	Prevent Professional Concerns Case Conferences – a multi agency case conferencing arrangement that assesses vulnerability in individuals who may be involved or supporting terrorism, and then seeks to agree interventions options and other actions to Prevent that individual becoming further engaged in terrorism.
WRAP	Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent – commonly regarded as the best training and awareness raising package for staff to enable a better understanding of the Prevent strategy, radicalisation, exploitation and terrorism
ISP	Information Sharing Protocol – a document which clearly states the terms and conditions and legislative parameters by which information will be shared with partners
Radicaliser	An individual, often charismatic, who tries to recruit people to an extremist or terrorist cause. A radicaliser will often use a single narrative as a technique to recruit people to such a cause
Single Narrative	A single and often simplistic, but compelling, version of history or events that encourages sympathy or engagement with a terrorist or extremist cause
CT	Counter Terrorism



Scottish Local Authorities

CONTEST Prevent

Code of practice





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